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Abstract
Spatial dispersal policies may influence labour market integration
of refugees through two mechanisms. First, it may aﬀect the local
job oﬀer arrival rate, and second, it may aﬀect place utility. We in-
vestigate the second mechanism theoretically by formulating a par-
tial search model in which an individual searches simultaneously for
a job and for a new residential location. The model predicts that
the reservation wage for local jobs is decreasing in place utility. We
argue that spatial dispersal policies decrease average place utility of
refugees which decrease the transition rate into first job due to large
local reservation wage eﬀects. We investigate both mechanisms empir-
ically and test the predictions of the theoretical model by evaluating
the employment eﬀects of the Danish spatial dispersal policy carried
out 1986-1998.
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1 Introduction
Spatial dispersal policy on asylum seekers and refugees is commonly be-
lieved to promote labour market integration of refugees. This study provides
theoretical and empirical evidence that spatial dispersal policy may in fact
hamper labour market integration of refugees.
Mandatory spatial dispersal policies that direct all newly-arrived refugees
and asylum seekers away from immigrant-dense metropolitan areas are imple-
mented in several European countries, e.g. UK, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway and Denmark. Voluntary spatial dispersal policies are used in other
European countries, e.g. Sweden. The rationale for a spatial dispersal policy
is in general threefold; first, to distribute the financial and social costs of
receipt of asylum seekers and refugees between local authorities (the pub-
lic finance motive); second, to avoid increasing pressure on housing in areas
that are already under stress (the housing motive); and third, to increase the
speed of acquisition of host-country-specific human capital, such as language
skills and knowledge about the host country through increased interaction
with the majority population (the integration motive).
Opponents to spatial dispersal policies claim, however, that lack of free
location choice increases secondary migration rates, i.e. relocation within the
host country, which will undo some of the intended results of the policy. This
claim is supported by evidence for Norway (Djuve and Kavli 2000), Sweden
(Åslund 2001) and Denmark (Hummelgaard et al. 1995, Damm 2005a) which
report relocation rates of 33-38% of placed refugees three-four years after
initial settlement, higher relocation rates out of rural areas and secondary
migration towards towns and cities. Furthermore, Edin et al. (2004) conclude
that refugees dispersed according to the Swedish mandatory spatial dispersal
policy in place until 1994, the ’Whole of Sweden’ strategy, experienced long-
run losses (in terms of earnings, idleness and welfare receipt) due to the
dispersal policy. Specifically, their estimates suggest that the probability
of being idle eight years after immigration would have been 19 percentage
points higher if refugees had stayed in the assigned municipalities compared
to the situation of free location choice prior to implementation of the dispersal
policy. However, they stress that the secondary migration pattern lowered
the potential long-run losses of the policy because of the tendency for refugees
to leave regions with bad employment prospects.
This study provides a theoretical model for analysis of how spatial dis-
persal policy aﬀects employment outcomes of asylum seekers and refugees.
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In addition, it provides empirical evidence of the employment eﬀects of the
Danish spatial dispersal policy in place between 1986 and 1998.
We argue that spatial dispersal policies may aﬀect job finding rates of
asylum seekers and refugees through two mechanisms. First, settlement in
sparsely populated regions without immigrant networks may give rise to dif-
ferent job-oﬀer arrival rates than settlement in immigrant-dense metropoli-
tan areas. Whether such a diﬀerence exists is an empirical question. Second,
lack of free initial location choice is likely to decrease refugees’ value of initial
place utility. We investigate the eﬀect of low place utility on the job find-
ing rate by formulating a search model in which non-employed individuals
simultaneously search for a job (locally and outside the local labour market)
and for a better location of residence. Our model predicts that the lower
the current place utility, the higher are the transition rates into a new region
of residence and into non-local employment and the lower is the transition
rate into local employment. We argue that the local reservation wage eﬀect
is likely to dominate the non-local reservation wage eﬀect. If so, lower place
utility decreases the overall job finding rate while acceptance of a residential
oﬀer in a new region increases the overall job finding rate.
We test the hypotheses of the model using administrative register data
on refugees subject to the Danish spatial dispersal policy. Specifically, we
estimate the eﬀects of initial location characteristics and the average eﬀect of
relocation on the transition rate into first job. We correct for selection into re-
location by joint estimation of the duration of the first non-employment spell
and the duration of a residential spell, using the timing-of-events method, i.e.
a bivariate mixed proportional hazard model. Our empirical results show,
first, that the hazard rate into first job is decreasing in the local population
size and the local number of immigrants. These findings support the im-
plementation of a spatial dispersal policy in Denmark. Second, on average
relocation has a large and positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into first job.
This eﬀect provides evidence in favour of our hypothesis that spatial disper-
sal leads to lower average place utility and thereby reduces local and overall
job finding rates. Simulations show that in the Danish case the latter eﬀect
dominates the former so that the Danish spatial dispersal policy slowed down
labour market integration of asylum seekers and refugees.
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2 The Danish Spatial Dispersal Policy
1986 marks the start of the first Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees
and asylum seekers who had just received a residence permit. Henceforth we
will refer to refugees and asylum seekers as refugees. The Danish Govern-
ment urged the Danish Refugee Council to implement the dispersal policy
after a surge in refugees in the mid-eighties made it increasingly diﬃcult for
the Council to satisfy the location preferences of most refugees for accom-
modation in the larger cities. The policy was in force until 1999 under the
charge of the Council. The Council’s assignment policy aimed at promoting
an equal share of refugees in all counties. At the county level, the Coun-
cil aimed at attaining of an equal share of refugees in municipalities with
suitable facilities for reception such as housing, educational institutions, em-
ployment opportunities, and fellow countrymen. In practice, these dispersal
criteria implied that refugees were provided with permanent housing in cities
and towns and to a lesser extent in the rural districts (Ministry of Internal
Aﬀairs 1996). In 1986, 182 out of a total of 275 municipalities in Denmark re-
ceived refugees who during an introductory period of 18 months participated
in Danish language courses while receiving social assistance.
Dispersal was voluntary in the sense that only refugees who were unable
to find housing themselves were subject to the dispersal policy. However,
the take-up rate was high; between 1986 and 1997 approximately 90% of
recognized refugees were provided with permanent housing by the Council
(or after 1995 by a local government) under the terms of the dispersal policy
(Annual Reports of the Danish Refugee Council 1986-1994 and the Council’s
internal administrative statistics for 1995-1998).
Refugees were urged to stay in the assigned municipality during the entire
introductory period. However, there were no relocation restrictions. Refugees
could move away from the municipality of assignment at any time, in so far
as they could find alternative housing elsewhere. Receipt of welfare was
unconditional on residing in the assigned municipality.
The dispersal policy did, at least in the short run, influence the location
pattern of refugees. In 1993 the settlement pattern of refugees resembled
that of the Danish population and diﬀered greatly from that of non-western
immigrants.1
171% of non-western immigrants, 33% of refugees and 26% of the Danish population
lived in the capital or in the suburbs. 24% of non-western immigrants, 56% of refugees
and 59% of the Danish population lived in towns outside the capital. Only 5% of the
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A new spatial dispersal policy was implemented in 1999, aiming at pro-
moting better integration of refugees by means of mandatory and increased
spatial dispersal and an extended introduction programme supplied by the
municipality of assignment and by making receipt of social assistance in the
first three years conditional on residing in the assigned municipality (Law
no. 474 passed the 1st of July 1998).
Damm (2005b) argues that the Danish spatial dispersal policy 1986-1998
gave rise to a random initial distribution of refugees who were provided per-
manent housing by the Council, conditional on seven characteristics of the
individual: marital status, health (in need of special medical or psychological
treatment), special educational needs, the location of close relatives, nation-
ality, year of immigration (over time it became increasingly diﬃcult for the
Council to find housing in the larger and medium-sized towns) as well as
reluctance to accept assignment to a non-preferred county. These governing
factors suggest that non-single refugees with special treatment and educa-
tional needs and refugees with close family in Denmark near whom they
were determined to live and who arrived early in the observation period
were most likely to realise their preferred settlement option. Three of these
characteristics are observed in Danish administrative registers (described in
Section 5): family status (measured by marital status and number of chil-
dren), nationality, and year of immigration. Moreover, Damm (2005b) argues
that age and nationality may be decent proxies for special educational needs,
and that nationality and size of the ethnic stock may be decent proxies for
whether the individual had close family in Denmark at the time of arrival.
In contrast, the registers do not contain any decent proxy for need of special
medical or psychological treatment. Finally, the last-mentioned characteris-
tic is probably of minor importance: the combination of high take-up rates
and low reassignment rates indicates that only a small fraction of the refugees
insisted on living in a particular area.
In the empirical analysis we thus condition on five out of the six char-
acteristics that may have influenced the initial settlement of an individual:
marital status, number of children, nationality, year of immigration, age, and
size of the ethnic stock. This allows us to treat the initial location of a refugee
as otherwise exogenous.
non-western immigrants lived in rural districts against almost 12% of refugees and 15% of
the Danish population (Danish Refugee Council 1993).
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3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we formulate a partial search model to investigate how spatial
dispersal policies on refugees aﬀect their labour market integration.2
Knowledge of the main features of spatial dispersal policies is a prereq-
uisite for formulation of such a model. Past and current spatial dispersal
policies on refugees implemented in Europe or the U.S. have two features
in common. First, individuals subject to the policy tend to settle initially
outside immigrant-dense cities. Second, the authorities decide the initial
location of individuals subject to the policy.
Spatial dispersal policies may influence job oﬀer arrival rates of individu-
als subject to the policy if individual job oﬀer arrival rates depend on location
choice, both at the regional and the neighbourhood level. Regional charac-
teristics that may aﬀect individual job oﬀer arrival rates include regional un-
employment rates that could diﬀer systematically between immigrant-dense
cities and more sparsely populated regions without immigrants. Whether
this is the case is an empirical issue to be evaluated in any given context.
Neighbourhood characteristics that potentially influence individual job oﬀer
arrival rates include the level of segregation of immigrants in the neighbour-
hood of residence. Several competing theories exist about how settlement in
an immigrant neighbourhood aﬀects job oﬀer arrival rates of immigrants. The
spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain 1968; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1990) and
the hypothesis about slower acquisition of host-country-specific human capi-
tal (Chiswick 1991; Chiswick andMiller 1995, 1996; Lazear 1999) predict that
settlement in immigrant enclaves aﬀect immigrant labour market outcomes
negatively. The theories about human capital externalities (Borjas 1995,
1998; Cutler and Glaeser 1997), social network eﬀects (Portes 1987; Lazear
1999; Bertrand et al. 2000) and peer group eﬀects (Coleman 1966; Wilson
1987; Case and Katz 1991; Borjas 1995; Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman
1996) predict that settlement in immigrant enclaves aﬀect immigrant labour
market outcomes positively or negatively depending on the ’quality’ of the
immigrant enclave. Hence, theoretically the employment eﬀect of settlement
in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods is ambiguous in sign and should there-
fore also be investigated empirically in a given context.
For these reasons the theoretical model we formulate ignores that spatial
dispersal may aﬀect individual job oﬀer arrival rates by aﬀecting the job oﬀer
2For more details on the model, see Damm and Rosholm (2003).
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arrival rate in the local labour market. Our objective is instead to formulate
a model that enables us to predict how the lack of free location choice aﬀects
job finding rates of individuals subject to the policy.
A related literature exists, which explains job and residential search be-
haviour for unemployed and employed workers in general. Many of these
studies rely on a sequential ordering of the decision to change residence or
job. So individuals search either for jobs given their residence or for a new
residence given their job. Examples of the former models include Sugden
(1980), Simpson (1980), Van Ophem (1991), Van den Berg (1992), Rouwen-
dal and Rietveld (1994) and Molho (2001). The latter models include Wein-
berg (1979), Weinberg et al. (1981), Smith and Clark (1982), Clark and
Flowerdew (1982) and Pickles and Davies (1991). However, a theory which
does not rely on such sequential ordering of the decision to change job or
residence is better suited for understanding the interaction between the two
decisions. Such a simultaneous search model is developed by Van Ommeren
et al. (1997, 2000). In their model, individuals maximise life-time utility
by moving through diﬀerent labour market and residential location states,
taking into consideration that moving from one state to another is costly.
Optimal strategies are derived both for employed and non-employed individ-
uals giving rise to four reservation value strategies, for job moves/acceptance
and residential relocation for employed and unemployed individuals, respec-
tively. One of their main conclusions based on the search model is that the
reservation wages for employed and non-employed depend on labour market
characteristics as well as housing market characteristics. That is also the
case for the reservation place utility.
The model by Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) constitutes a good de-
scription of the interaction between job and residential mobility for native
born individuals. Refugees, however, may initially diﬀer from natives by lack
of information necessary for conducting e.g. job search outside a defined
local labour market. Furthermore, spatial dispersal policies aim at labour
market integration of refugees within the region of assignment. For these
two reasons, the distinction between the local labour market and the non-
local labour market is important for analysis of employment eﬀects of spatial
dispersal policies on refugees. The model by Van Ommeren et al. (1997,
2000) does not distinguish between local and non-local job search. The opti-
mal search strategies for refugee immigrants may therefore be diﬀerent from
those described in Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000).
In our model refugees begin searching for a job and a new residence
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simultaneously, at the time of receipt of a residence permit. Individuals may
search in three dimensions. First, individuals can search for new residential
location instead of the location of assignment. Second, they may search for
a job locally, i.e. within commuting distance of the present residence, and
finally, they may search for employment outside the local labour market.
Individuals face a set of alternative residential locations and a set of
alternative employment opportunities. The individual examines the costs
and benefits of any residential location or job oﬀer, taking into account once-
only costs associated with changing residential location. As a non-local job
is a job situated outside feasible commuting distance by assumption, the
individual will have to move in order to accept such a job oﬀer. In order
to avoid further technical complexities, we assume that a job oﬀer in the
non-local labour market carries with it a residential oﬀer, that is, it is a draw
from a bivariate distribution of job and residential oﬀers.
Individuals derive utility from income y and place utility r3. The income is
bwhile non-employed (e.g. social assistance), and the wage w while employed.
The instantaneous utility u experienced by an individual is assumed to be a
linear function of y and r,
u(y, r) = y + r (1)
where r is suitably normalized. The cross-derivatives are assumed to be zero
because we want to focus on the ’pure’ dependencies between the reservation
strategies and not on dependencies arising from interaction terms in the util-
ity function. The individual faces once-only costs, c, of changing residence.
From the individual’s point of view, the economy consists of two labour
markets, the local labour market which contains all jobs within commuting
distance from the current location of residence, and the non-local labour
market which contains all jobs in the rest of the country. We assume that job
oﬀers in both regions arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
αl in the local labour market and αn in the non-local labour market. Thus,
in the real world αl will typically be much larger than αn, see e.g. the study
by Munch et al. (2003). Note that a job oﬀer in the non-local labour market
carries with it a residential location oﬀer, because an individual cannot work
outside the local labour market without changing residence. Furthermore,
3The concept of ’place utility’ was developed by Wolpert who defined it as ”a positive
or negative quantity, expressing respectively the individual’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with respect to that place” (Wolpert 1965, 162).
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individuals receive residence oﬀers from outside the local labour market (with
no associated job oﬀers) which arrive according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate β.
When a job oﬀer is accepted, the individual keeps the job forever. More-
over, once a job is accepted, the individual also stops searching for a new
residence and thus settles down forever. This implies that the value of hold-
ing a job paying the wage w at a location yielding place utility r is
W (w, r) =
w + r
ρ
(2)
where ρ is the discount rate.
A residence oﬀer is characterised by the place utility r, which is a random
draw from a distribution Fr(r). A job is characterised by the wage w and by
its location. Local job oﬀers are random draws from a distribution Fw(w).
Non-local job oﬀers are random draws from the joint wage and place utility
distribution Fw,r(w, r). The suprema of w and r are denoted as
_
w and
_
r,
respectively. For simplicity we assume that fw,r(w, r) = fw(w)fr(r).
The value of being unemployed is the discounted expected lifetime utility
derived from income flows and current place utilities, denoted by the value
function V (r0), where r0 denotes the place utility at the initial (exogenous)
location. Note that under the assumption of random initial location, which
is basically what the spatial dispersal policies conducted in Denmark aspire
at, the initial place utility is a random draw from Fr(r). The flow value of
being non-employed with initial place utility r0 is4
ρV (r0) = b+ r0 + αlEwmax [0,W (w, r0)− V (r0)] (3)
+αnEw,rmax [0,W (w, r)− c− V (r0)]
+βErmax [0, V (r)− c− V (r0)] .
The interpretation of the asset equation 3 is as follows. The flow value
of being non-employed is equal to the sum of four components: The instan-
taneous utility of the current income and residence, the option value of local
job search, the option value of non-local job search, and the option value of
residential search. The flow value of being non-employed can be shown to be
increasing in current place utility.
4Details of the derivations as well as the proofs of all propositions made below can be
found in Damm and Rosholm (2003).
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Assuming that b < w and that αl, αn, β, ρ > 0 ensures the existence of
reservation values w∗(r0),
©
Rw|r(r0)
ª
and r∗(r0). w∗(r0) is the reservation
wage for local jobs, and
©
Rw|r(r0)
ª
is a set of reservation wages for jobs
outside the commuting area. These are conditional on the current place
utility, r0, but also on the place utility associated with the job oﬀer, that
is, there is a distribution of reservation wages over associated place utilities.
Finally, r∗(r0) is the reservation place utility for residence oﬀers. In the rest
of the paper, the dependence of the reservation values on current reservation
place utility is suppressed for notational simplicity.
These reservation strategies imply that job and residential mobility of
non-employed persons are described by transition rates which are the product
of an oﬀer arrival rate and an acceptance probability.
The transition rate into a local job is thus
hl = αl [1− Fw(w∗)] (4)
while the transition rate into a non-local job is
hn = αn
¡
1−Er[Fw(Rw|r)]
¢
(5)
The transition rate into employment, h, is the sum of the local and non-
local job finding rate
h = hl + hn (6)
Exploiting the reservation value properties, elaborating further on the
value function equations using integration by parts allows us to rewrite the
asset equation as
ρV (r0) = b+ r0 +
α1
ρ
Z w
w∗
[1− Fw(w)]dw
+
α2
ρ
Z _r
0
Z w
Rw|r
[1− Fw(w)]dwdFr(r)
+β
Z r
r∗
∂V (r)/∂r · [1− Fr(r)]dr (7)
We now have the following results:
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Proposition 1 r∗ is increasing in r0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The higher current place
utility, the better must a residence oﬀer be for an individual to accept it.
Thus, living in a location which oﬀers a low place utility implies a low reser-
vation place utility and consequently a high transition rate into a new region
of residence, hr.
Proposition 2 Rw|r is increasing in r0, while w∗ is decreasing in r0.
Thus, living in a place which oﬀers a low place utility implies a low
reservation wage for jobs involving a residential move and consequently a
high transition rate into such jobs, hn. The intuition for the result is that the
lower current place utility, the less attached is an individual to his current
residential location, and consequently, for a given place utility oﬀer r, the
lower will the wage oﬀers from outside the local labour market have to be to
attract him the job.
Turning to the second result, an increase in the current place utility de-
creases the reservation wage for local jobs, because the option value of re-
ceiving a non-local job oﬀer and of receiving a residential oﬀer both decrease.
Thus, living in a place which yields low place utility implies that an individual
must be ’compensated’ for the low place utility by a high wage. Therefore,
the individual will set a high reservation wage in the local job market and
consequently have a low local job finding rate, hl. A better local wage oﬀer
is needed to compensate the individual for the foregone option value from
non-local job search and residential search.
Proposition 3 h is increasing in r0 if and only if
α1fw(w∗)
1 + α1ρ [1− Fw(w∗)]
>
α2fw(Rw|r)
α2
ρ
R _r
0
[1− Fw(Rw|r)]dFr(r) + βρ [1− Fr(r∗)]
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The proposition states that the transition rate into employment is in-
creasing in current place utility, if the increase in the transition rate into
local jobs, resulting from the decline in the local job reservation wage, w∗,
exceeds the decline in the transition rate into jobs outside the local labour
market, resulting from the increase in the national job reservation wage, Rw|r.
In the case of the Danish labour market, this derivative is likely to be posi-
tive, as the transition rate into local jobs is close to 100 times larger than the
transition rate into jobs outside the local labour market. Hence, we would
expect the impact on the local job reservation wage to dominate.
These comparative static results can be used for analysing the implica-
tions of a spatial dispersal policy for refugees. Spatial dispersal is likely to
imply relatively low average values of current place utility, r0, due to lack
of an ethnic network and lack of influence on the choice of location. Since
refugees are not free to choose where to live, some of them will find them-
selves in locations to which they attribute very low place utility. Proposition 1
then implies that, a priori, spatial dispersal policies are likely to lead to lower
reservation place utilities and consequently higher relocation rates, especially
in case of mandatory spatial dispersal. The high subsequent migration rates
of refugees who had initially been subject to spatial dispersal policy found in
empirical studies for Sweden, Norway and Denmark are supportive evidence
in favour of this hypothesis.
Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that, a priori, spatial dispersal policies
- low average values of current place utility - are expected to lead to lower
transition rates into local employment due to higher local reservation wages
and to higher transition into employment outside the local labour market
due to lower reservation wages in the non-local labour market. Hence, spatial
dispersal policies have the likely implication that a better local wage oﬀer
is required to compensate the individual for the foregone option value from
non-local job search and residential search.
The implication of Proposition 3 is that the eﬀect of spatial dispersal
policies on the job finding rate is ambiguous. However, empirically the eﬀect
is likely to be negative, at least for most European labour markets, which
are characterised by a transition rate into local jobs close to 100 times larger
than the transition rates into jobs outside the local labour market.
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4 Empirical Model
A duration model is a natural empirical counterpart of a search model. We
simplify the empirical model relative to the theoretical model by ignoring the
distinction between local and non-local jobs. The reason is that our empirical
objective is to estimate the eﬀect of the spatial dispersal policy on the overall
job finding rate.
4.1 Econometric specification
The random variable Tu denotes the duration since receipt of residence permit
until the first job. This is our key variable of interest. Let the random variable
Tr denote the time spent in a given municipality of residence. In addition,
m is an index denoting whether a residential spell is the first, second, third
up to the Mth residential spell for that person. Finally, let xu and xrm be
time-invariant vectors of observed covariates (initial values) and vu and vr
represent unobserved covariates.
The transition rate into a new residential location and the transition rate
into first job are assumed to be given by Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH)
functions,
hr(trm|xrm, vr) = λr(trm) · ϕr(xrm) · exp(vr),m = 1, ...,M (8)
hu(tu|trm,xu, vu) = λu(tu) · ϕu(xu) · exp(δ1I {tr1 ≤ tu|tu < tr1 + tr2})
· exp(δ2I {tr1 + tr2 ≤ tu|tu < tr1 + tr2 + tr3}) · ...
· exp(δMI
(
MX
m=1
trm ≤ tu
)
) · exp(vu) (9)
where xrm includes a set of indicators for whether it is the first, second,
..., mth residential spell of the individual. I(.) is an indicator function for
the event in brackets. The hazard rate into first job is consequently allowed
to move to another level at the moment at which the duration of a residential
spell is completed. δm,m = 1, ...,M, are the main parameters of interest since
the estimate of δm is the causal eﬀect of relocation on the job finding rate
and can be interpreted as an average eﬀect of treatment on the treated. In
the empirical analysis we restrict the causal eﬀect of relocations subsequent
to the first relocation to be the same, i.e. δ2 = δ3 = ... = δM .
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The likelihood contribution of a residential spell and of the first non-
employment spell is, conditional on observed and unobserved covariates
Lrm = hr(trm|xrm, vr)dr · exp[−
Z trm
0
hr(s|xrm, vr)ds] (10)
Lu = hu(tu|trm,xu, vu)du · exp[−
Z tu
0
hu(s|xu, vu)ds] (11)
respectively, where dr and du are non-censoring indicators. A residential spell
is treated as right-censored if a person finds a job before making a (further)
relocation. The total contribution to the likelihood function for a single
individual is then
L =
Z
Vu
Z
Vr
Lu(tu|trm,Xu, Vu) ·
MY
m=1
Lrm(trm|Xrm, Vr)dG(Vu, Vr) (12)
where G(·) is the joint CDF for Vu and Vr, andM is the number of residential
spells an individual experiences before finding the first job.
We assume the distributions of the unobserved terms to be discrete with
two-by-two unrestricted mass-point locations. Let v1u, v
2
u,v
1
r, and v
2
r denote
the mass-points of Vu and Vr, respectively. The associated probabilities are
as follows:
Pr(Vu = v1u, Vr = v
1
r) = p1 Pr(Vu = v
1
u, Vr = v
2
r) = p2 (13)
Pr(Vu = v2u, Vr = v
1
r) = p3 Pr(Vu = v
2
u, Vr = v
2
r) = p4 (14)
with 0≤ pi ≤ 1 for i =1,...,4, and
P4
i=1 pi = 1.We normalise the distribu-
tion of the unobservables by letting exp(v1j) = 1 for j = u, r.
The observed part of the individual-specific hazard function is specified
as: ϕj(Xl) = exp(X
0
lβj), j = u, r and l = u, rm. The baseline hazard rates
are assumed to be piecewise constant, i.e. λj(t) = exp(αjk), k = 1, ..., Kj,
j = u, r, where Kj is the number of intervals for the baseline hazard of spell
type j. The length of each baseline interval is chosen on the basis of the
empirical hazard functions for exit to first job and exit from municipality of
residence presented in Section 5.
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) provide identification results for this
model, which has become known as the ’timing-of-events’ model. The main
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identification issue is how to disentangle the eﬀect of relocation from the se-
lection eﬀect. If individuals who move at time tr have relatively short (long)
durations, tu, it can be for two reasons: Either the individual ’treatment’
eﬀect is positive or treated individuals have relatively high values of vu and
would have found a job relatively fast anyway. The authors show that given
an assumption of no anticipation of the realisation of the treatment, the two
eﬀects can be disentangled without resorting to exclusion restrictions. How-
ever, individuals are allowed to know the probability distribution of time until
relocation. In addition, identification requirements are independence of xr
and xu from vi, i = u, r, and an assumption of existence of the first moment
of vi unless multiple observations are available for each vi pair, which they
are not in the present context. If these identification requirements are met,
the eﬀect of relocation on the job finding rate is identified. The identification
argument is based on exogenous variation in the timing of events; if there
is exogenous variation in the timing of relocation, it can be identified sepa-
rately from the selection eﬀect. The latter is based on unobserved individual
heterogeneity, which is constant over the non-employment spell. The eﬀect
of relocation, however, does not appear in the non-employment hazard be-
fore relocation has occurred. This also illustrates why the assumption of no
anticipation is important. If the eﬀect of relocation is present throughout the
non-employment spell, we cannot be sure to disentangle it from a selection
eﬀect.
We believe that the assumption of no anticipation is approximately sat-
isfied in the present context due to housing market restrictions and frictions
faced by refugees. Refugees have limited access to owner-occupied housing
because of liquidity constraints and the law prohibiting foreigners with less
than five years of residence in Denmark buying real estate in Denmark. This
may explain why only 6% of movers in our refugee sample described in Sec-
tion 5 lived in owner-occupied housing after the move. Turning to the private
rental market, it is characterised by extensive rent control which results in
queues. Refugees in particular are likely to have to queue for a long time
because of lack a Danish network to facilitate access, and due to potential
discrimination by private landlords. In contrast, refugees have easy access to
social housing because socially and economically disadvantaged individuals
with housing problems have priority to 25% of vacant social housing units.
Renters in the social housing sector have 3 months’ notice. Therefore, an
apartment vacancy is often announced only 2-2.5 months prior to the apart-
ment vacancy. An individual who has applied for a vacant apartment is likely
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to receive that information about two months before the actual apartment
vacancy. Remember that individuals are allowed to know the distribution of
residential spell durations, just not the actual date of relocation too long in
advance. In the present context with fairly long residential spells 2 months’
anticipation is of minor importance.
5 Data
5.1 Refugee sample
Our micro data on refugees is extracted from longitudinal administrative
registers of Statistics Denmark on the immigrant population in Denmark
1984-2000. Our refugee sample has information on 28,056 individuals. Ide-
ally this sample should cover observations on all adult refugees who were
assigned to a municipality by the Council under the terms of the spatial
dispersal policy carried out from 1986 to 1998. However, information on ad-
mission category of immigrants and the assignment municipality of refugees
is missing in the registers. We take account of the first issue by applying an
algorithm based on country of origin and the first year of residence permit
to Denmark to extract individuals from 17 refugee-sending countries. The
algorithm was constructed from oﬃcial figures on the annual number of res-
idence permits granted to refugees by country of origin. Solving the second
data issue is further complicated by the fact that refugees may initially have
lived in temporary housing in proximity of the municipality to which they
were later assigned, on average after 1 year. We identify the municipality of
assignment by using a rather complicated algorithm which we constructed
based on information on the Council’s internal administrative statistics on
temporary housing. We define the first municipality of residence observed
in the registers as a municipality of temporary housing if the person relo-
cates to another municipality within the county within one year after receipt
of residence permit. Otherwise the first municipality is defined as the mu-
nicipality of assignment. Furthermore, we want to exclude family-reunified
immigrants from refugee-sending countries, because they were not subject
to spatial dispersal, unless they immigrated shortly after their spouse. We
therefore exclude immigrants from refugee-sending countries, who at the time
of immigration were married to either 1) a Dane, 2) an immigrant from a
non-refugee-sending country or 3) an immigrant from a refugee-sending coun-
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try who had immigrated at least one year earlier. Unfortunately the registers
do not allow us to exclude the 10% of refugees who turned down the Coun-
cil’s oﬀer of housing under the terms of the spatial dispersal policy. Finally,
we include only individuals aged 18-59, because individuals outside this age
range are unlikely to search for a job.
For each individual we have monthly information on labour market state.
Moreover, we know the individual’s municipality of residence (at the end
of each year) and the date of the last residential move (by the end of each
year). This allows us to construct the first non-employment spell and hence
the time until first job, and all residential spells prior to the first job for each
individual. Employment covers labour market states such as employment
as wage-earner, self-employment and assistant spouse, but excludes partic-
ipation in active labour market programmes and leave schemes. We ignore
residential moves within a municipality.
Descriptive statistics on the non-employment and residential spells are
shown in Table 5.1. Note that 52% of men and 34% of women find employ-
ment in the observation period, on average 39 months after immigration.
Note further that 32% of residential spells for men and 26% of residential
spells for women are completed, on average after 21 months of residence.
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics on non-employment and residential spells.
Sub sample Non-employment spell Frequency Distr. (%) Mean duration Std. dev.
MEN Completed 8,896 52.4 37.8 28.9
Right-censored 8,083 47.6 53.1 37.8
All 16,979 100 45.1 34.3
WOMEN Completed 3,727 33.6 40.4 31.1
Right-censored 7,350 66.4 50.1 36.1
All 11,077 100 46.8 34.8
Residential spells
MEN Completed 7,990 31.8 19.5 18.4
Right-censored 16,802 68.2 34.5 28.6
All 24,792 100 29.7 26.7
WOMEN Completed 3,799 25.7 22.7 21.0
Right-censored 11,013 74.3 39.3 30.7
All 14,812 100 35.0 29.4
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Further investigation of features of the spells shows the following. First,
the first employment spell on average lasts a year and it exceeds 3 months for
70% of the individuals. Second, 33% of men and 27% of women have moved
at least once before finding their first job and 9 % of men and 5% of women
have moved at least twice before finding their first job.
The empirical hazard functions for exit to first job and for relocation are
shown separately for men and women in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The empirical
hazard rate for exit to first job attains its maximum in month 18 for men
and 17 for women, while the empirical hazard function for relocation peaks
in month 13 for both men and women. The empirical survivor functions
for first non-employment spell and residence in the initial municipality are
shown separately for men and women in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The first figure
shows that at the end of the observation period 18% of men and 32% of
women still have not found a job. The second figure shows that at the end of
the observation period 40% of men and 50% of women still live in the initial
municipality.
We now turn to description of the initial geographical settlement and
relocation pattern of individuals in our sample. Denmark is divided into
275 municipalities which vary extensively in number of inhabitants. The
four largest municipalities have more than 100,000 inhabitants. They cover
at least parts of the four largest cities in Denmark: Copenhagen, Aarhus,
Odense and Aalborg. 132 municipalities have between 10,000 and 100,000
inhabitants. We refer to these as medium-sized. They cover mainly urban
areas. Finally, 139 municipalities have less than 10,000 inhabitants and are
referred to as small. They cover both smaller urban areas and rural districts.
In the 1990s 18% of the Danish population lived in small municipalities, 61%
in medium-sized municipalities and 21% in large municipalities. The initial
distribution of individuals in our sample was such that they were initially
slightly overrepresented in the large municipalities and slightly underrepre-
sented in the small municipalities. However, interestingly the initial settle-
ment pattern varied substantially between subgroups of the individuals in our
sample. Relative to those who did not move, movers were substantially over-
represented in the smaller municipalities and considerably underrepresented
in the larger municipalities. This may indicate that individuals’ relocation
decision was aﬀected by the size of municipality of assignment. This hypoth-
esis is substantiated by evidence showing that the relocation rates out of the
initial municipality of residence is decreasing in municipality size and that
the net inflow of movers is increasing in municipality size. In fact only large
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municipalities experience a positive net-inflow of movers. Investigating the
relocation pattern of movers further, we find that refugees who move at least
twice are more likely to move to a small or medium-sized municipality in
their first move than those who only move once. But the destination pat-
tern of refugees’ second relocation corresponds to the destination pattern of
refugees who move once; the net-inflow of twice movers is positive only for
large municipalities. In sum, we can conclude that secondary migration of
unemployed refugees increased the concentration of unemployed refugees in
the larger municipalities.
5.2 Explanatory variables
The administrative registers contain information on age, marital status, num-
ber of children, country of origin, and year of immigration, as well as infor-
mation on education. These variables are described in Table A.1 in the
Appendix.
In addition, the job oﬀer arrival rate in a given region is likely to be af-
fected by a number of local labour market characteristics and the reservation
values are likely to be aﬀected by both local labour market and housing char-
acteristics. Therefore we include a number of municipality-specific variables.
The construction of these variables is described in the Appendix, and their
first two moments are given in Table A.1 as well.
We expect the regional unemployment rate to be a key variable, influ-
encing the regional job oﬀer arrival rate negatively. Another factor which
may influence the regional job oﬀer arrival rate is the extent to which local
councils co-operate with local firms with respect to qualifying refugees for
the host-country labour market, for instance by use of private job training
programmes as part of active labour market programmes. The extent to
which such co-operation takes place is unobserved to us, but it is believed to
be systematically related to the share of right-wing versus left-wing represen-
tation in the local councils, and therefore we include the share of right-wing
votes at the latest local election in the empirical analysis.
A labour market characteristic of potential importance for the reservation
wage is the share of the county’s jobs located in the municipality in which a
person lives. The idea is that individuals are likely to set a lower reservation
wage when oﬀered a job close to the place of residence because of commuting
costs.
Turning to housing market factors which may influence the rate of relo-
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cation out of a given municipality, we expect the local residence oﬀer arrival
rate to be increasing in the number of social housing units in percent of the
total local housing stock, which should reduce the relocation rate out of the
municipality, since adjustment of housing consumption can take place within
the current local area.
We argue in the following that the current place utility is increasing in
the local number of fellow countrymen, local access to vocational educational
institutions and local access to amenities oﬀered by larger cities. Recent im-
migrants may derive high place utility from living close to fellow countrymen
for the following two reasons. First, recent immigrants are likely to have lim-
ited information about the host country whereas ethnic enclaves constitute
well-known cultural, social and economic environments which facilitate their
adjustment to the new society (Piore 1979; Kobrin and Speare 1983). Specif-
ically, residence in an ethnic enclave strengthens feelings of security, solidar-
ity and identity within the group due to the common cultural background.
Furthermore, the local ethnic network may establish social institutions that
support its members in relation to the rest of the society. In addition, lo-
cal ethnic labour markets may develop further employment opportunities.
Finally, the ethnic network may convey information about employment op-
portunities outside the residential area. Second, living near ethnic enclaves
helps to reduce the costs of consumption of so-called ethnic goods defined
as the consumption characteristics of an ethnic group not shared with the
host population, broadly defined to include market and non-market goods
and services, including social interactions for themselves and their children
with people of the same origin (Chiswick and Miller 2005).
We believe the current place utility to be increasing in the size of the local
population, because recent immigrants tend to settle in larger cities (Bartel
1989), which may be due to a preference for residing near airports which
facilitate contact with old networks abroad, due to access to a large variety
of goods and services in general and due to the local population being more
accustomed to interactions with foreigners.
New refugees are likely to prefer living in a local area with many institu-
tions for vocational and higher education for numerous reasons. First, due
to lack of education from the source country. Second, due to lack of approval
of foreign educations in the host country. Third, due to a need for upgrad-
ing the skill level for employability in the host country labour market, for
instance due to a high minimum wage and a mismatch between low-skilled
job demand and supply in the host country.
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6 Policy evaluation
We now turn to evaluating the employment eﬀects of the Danish spatial dis-
persal policy in force 1986-1998. To this end we have estimated the timing-
of-events model described in Section 4. The model is estimated separately
for men and women to allow their job search process to be driven by diﬀer-
ent factors. The estimated hazard functions are plotted in Figure A.1 and
Figure A.2 in the Appendix, for an individual with mean observable and un-
observable characteristics. The corresponding estimated survivor functions
are plotted in Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 in the Appendix. In this section we
describe the main results of the estimated models.5 Note that all observed
covariates are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 in the estimation.
6.1 How location characteristics aﬀect employment
Our results confirm that the local labour market characteristics significantly
aﬀect the speed at which refugees find their first job, see Table 6.1. Initial
settlement in regions with high unemployment harms employment prospects
of refugees. A percentage point increase in the regional unemployment rate is
associated with a 2.6% - (exp(−0.0266)−1)·100 - decrease in the hazard rate
into first job for men and a 1.7% decrease in the hazard rate into first job for
women. The interpretation is that high regional unemployment implies a low
job oﬀer arrival rate. The percentage of county jobs in the municipality of
residence has a small, but significantly positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into
first job; a percentage point increase is associated with a 0.5% increase in the
hazard rate for men and with a 1.7% increase in the hazard rate for women.
We interpret the finding as evidence that residence close to jobs aﬀects the job
finding rate via a decreased reservation wage due to low costs of commuting.
Similarly, the percentage of right-wing votes at the latest local election is
found to have a significantly positive, although moderate, eﬀect on the job
finding hazard rate. This finding could be due to right-wing dominated
municipalities having more eﬃcient active labour market programmes for
refugees due to higher participation rates of unemployed refugees in private
sector on-the-job training rather than classroom training as a result of closer
cooperation with local firms compared to left-wing dominated municipalities.
5The full set of estimation results are available on request.
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Table 6.1 Estimated eﬀects of initial location characteristics on the hazard
rate into first job.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variable: Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Reg. unemp. rate/100 -2.666** 0.654 -1.705 0.956
% of county jobs/100 0.521* 0.211 1.709** 0.310
% right-wing votes/100 1.092** 0.122 2.179** 0.186
Log(immigrants)/10 -2.601** 0.242 -3.514** 0.376
Greater Copenhagen area -0.158** 0.039 -0.008 0.058
Medium municipality 0.432** 0.068 0.661** 0.102
Small municipality 0.445** 0.094 0.718** 0.140
Log(fellow countrymen)/10 0.420** 0.137 0.424* 0.209
No. of educ. institutions/100 2.688* 0.653 2.193* 0.947
% social housing/100 1.696** 0.152 2.860** 0.225
Notes: One and two asterisks indicate significance of the estimate at the 5 and 1
% levels, respectively. Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteristics
and time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the individual are included in the
employment model. In addition, selection into relocation is taken into account.
More importantly, our results show that initial settlement in a munic-
ipality with many immigrants is detrimental to employment outcomes of
refugees. A percentage point increase in the number of immigrants in the
municipality of residence is associated with a 23% decrease in the hazard rate
into first job for men and a 30% decrease in the hazard rate into first job for
women. A likely explanation may be that presence of immigrants increases
the probability of entry into the informal rather than the formal labour mar-
ket. Another explanation could be congestion; too many immigrants in one
location may be more than the local labour market can absorb due to excess
supply of low-skilled labour. However, further research into the causes of this
negative correlation is needed.
Residence outside a large municipality is found to have a significantly pos-
itive and large eﬀect on the hazard rate into first job. Specifically, the hazard
rate for men is 54-56% larger for individuals living in a small or medium-sized
municipality than for similar individuals who live in a large municipality. The
eﬀects are larger for women. The hazard rate into first job is approximately
twice as large for women who live in a small or medium-sized municipality
as for women who live in a large municipality. The interpretation of the
eﬀects of the size of the local population is not straightforward. It could be
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an exposure eﬀect, i.e. the smaller the local population the more exposed
the refugee is to host-country culture and language. Similarly, residence in
the greater Copenhagen area versus residence outside that area has an ad-
ditional significant and negative eﬀect on the hazard rate into first job for
men, possibly for the same reason.
The findings of a significant negative eﬀect of local population size and
presence of immigrants on the hazard rate into first job both support the
assumption underlying dispersal policies, that spatial dispersal of refugees
away from immigrant-dense cities facilitates their labour market integration.
However, interestingly the presence of fellow countrymen in the munici-
pality of residence has a significant and positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into
first job. A percentage point increase in the number of fellow countrymen
increases the hazard rate by 4.3% for both sexes. This finding can be inter-
preted as evidence in favour of existence of positive ethnic network eﬀects,
in particular that ethnic networks enhance the employment opportunities by
conveying information about employment opportunities or because jobs are
created within ethnic enclaves. However, in view of our theoretical model at
least part of the eﬀect may arise because an ethnic network locally increases
place utility which decreases the reservation wage with respect to local job
oﬀers. We will develop this argument further in subsection 6.3. In any case
causes for this positive correlation warrant further research.
Finally, the number of institutions for vocational and higher education
and the share of social housing in the municipality of residence is associated
with a moderate, but significantly positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into first
job for both men and women.
6.2 Selection into relocation
Our results confirm that the local housing oﬀer arrival rate for which we
use the percentage of social housing in the total local housing stock as a
proxy, influences the relocation rate negatively, see Table 6.2. The eﬀect
is significant but modest. A 1% point increase in the percentage of social
housing is associated with a 1% decrease in the relocation rate out of the
municipality.
We argued in Section 5 that current place utility is increasing in the lo-
cal number of fellow countrymen and immigrants, local access to vocational
institutions and local access to amenities oﬀered by larger cities. Our results
support the hypothesis. In particular, a 1% increase in the local number of
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immigrants significantly decreases the relocation rate by 9.5% for men and
17% for women. Similarly, a 1% increase in the local number of fellow coun-
trymen significantly decreases the hazard rate of relocation by 11% for men
and 8% for women. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
place utility is increasing in these two factors which capture the importance
of ethnic networks and ethnic goods. Furthermore, compared to men who
live in a large municipality, men residing in a medium and a small municipal-
ity have a 33% and 84% higher relocation rate, respectively. For women, the
corresponding numbers are 66% and 102%, respectively. Surprisingly, the
relocation rate is also higher for individuals residing in the greater Copen-
hagen area compared to individuals outside that area. However, descriptive
evidence (not reported here) shows that this finding is mainly explained by
high rates of relocation within the greater Copenhagen area. Finally, as ex-
pected access to institutions for vocational or higher education has a negative
eﬀect on the relocation hazard rate, however only insignificantly. Therefore,
access to vocational or higher education does not seem to be an important
determinant of refugees’ place utility.
Table 6.2 Estimated eﬀects of initial location characteristics on the hazard
rate of relocation.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variable: Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Reg. unemp. rate/100 -1.323 0.808 -0.317 1.129
% of county jobs/100 0.204 0.274 1.003* 0.435
% right-wing votes/100 0.467** 0.143 0.373 0.215
Log(immigrants)/10 -0.989** 0.291 -1.838** 0.439
Greater Copenhagen area 0.542** 0.050 0.560** 0.077
Medium municipality 0.287** 0.094 0.506** 0.148
Small municipality 0.609** 0.121 0.705** 0.184
Log(fellow countrymen)/10 -1.190** 0.170 -0.824** 0.253
No. of educ. institutions/100 -1.192 0.862 -0.172 1.348
% social housing/100 -1.237** 0.185 -2.072** 0.289
First location 0.889** 0.039 1.332** 0.062
Notes: One and two asterisks indicate significance of the estimate at the 5 and 1
% levels, respectively. Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteristics
and time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the individual are included in the
relocation model.
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The regional unemployment rate which is closely related to the job oﬀer
arrival rate is found to have an insignificant eﬀect on the relocation hazard
rate. Similarly, the eﬀect of the share of the county job in the municipality
of residence is found to be insignificantly positive for men, but significantly
positive for women. The positive sign may be due to the above-mentioned
higher rates of migration within the greater Copenhagen area. Interestingly,
the eﬀect of the share of right-wing votes at the latest local election is signif-
icantly positive for men. This may suggest that the policy instruments used
by right-wing dominated municipalities to increases the hazard rate into em-
ployment of refugees in the municipality above that of refugees in left-wing
dominated municipalities has a side-eﬀect in that the instruments make some
male refugees ’flee’ the municipality.
Finally, note that residence in the assigned municipality implies a hazard
rate of relocation which for men is as much as 143% larger than the hazard
rate for relocation out of subsequent municipalities of residence. The eﬀect
is even larger for women, namely 379%. A large, positive eﬀect could be ex-
pected given the initial random assignment of around 90% of the individuals
to a municipality of residence.
6.3 The causal eﬀect of relocation
Estimates of the average time-varying eﬀects of relocation on the hazard
rate into first job are shown in Table 6.3. The eﬀects of the first move and
of more than one move are estimated separately for 6 diﬀerent intervals of
time since the move: 1-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-12 months, 13-18 months,
19-24 months and more than 24 months. For men, relocation away from
the assigned municipality on average has a significantly positive eﬀect on
the hazard rate into first job and the eﬀect increases with time since the
move. On average leaving the assigned municipality also has a significantly
positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into first job for women, except in the
first time interval in which the eﬀect is close to zero. The time-varying
eﬀect of moving twice relative to staying in the assigned municipality is also
significantly positive in most time-intervals and increasing with time since
the second move.
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Table 6.3 Estimated eﬀects of relocation on the hazard rate into first job.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variable: Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
One move:
Move 0-3 months ago 0.216* 0.103 -0.016 0.215
Move 4-6 months ago 0.520** 0.091 0.568** 0.164
Move 7-12 months ago 0.489** 0.073 0.384** 0.139
Move 13-18 months ago 0.466** 0.078 0.589** 0.134
Move 19-24 months ago 0.464** 0.083 0.391** 0.153
Move > 24 months ago 0.408** 0.055 0.614** 0.088
Two moves:
Second move 0-3 months ago 0.374* 0.165 -0.018 0.447
Second move 4-6 months ago 0.270 0.181 0.814* 0.334
Second move 7-12 months ago 0.311* 0.136 0.212 0.319
Second move 13-18 months ago 0.564** 0.131 0.585* 0.293
Second move 19-24 months ago 0.504** 0.141 0.525 0.307
Second move > 24 months ago 0.568** 0.084 0.595** 0.154
Notes: One and two asterisks indicate significance of the estimate at the 5 and
1 % levels, respectively. Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteris-
tics and time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the individual and observed
location characteristics are included in the employment model. In addition, selec-
tion into relocation is taken into account.
For men, relative to no move the hazard rate into the first job is increased
by 24% 1-3 months after the first move, 68% 4-6 months after the first move
and around 58% from then on. For women, relative to no move the hazard
rate into first job is increased by 0% 1-3 months after the first move, 76% 4-6
months after the first move and 47%-85% from then on. The average eﬀects
of having moved twice are slightly higher.
These positive eﬀects of carrying out a cross-municipal move are likely to
stem at least in part from diﬀerences in unobserved location characteristics
before and after the move, such as presence of an ethnic network in the
municipality of destination which can facilitate job search in the new local
labour market. Not only may these unobserved factors aﬀect the local job
oﬀer arrival rate, they may also contribute to lower the reservation wage by
increasing place utility (and thus increase the local job oﬀer acceptance rate).
Since we only observe when an individual begins in a job and not - which
would have been preferable - when an individual actually got the job, one may
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worry that the positive eﬀects at least in part stem from reverse causality;
some movers may have found a job in another region prior to moving to the
region. However, if that were the case, we would expect the hazard rate into
first job to be very high immediately after relocation and to decline thereafter.
Our estimates of the time-varying eﬀect of relocation on the hazard rate into
first job show exactly the opposite. For both sexes the two relocation eﬀects
are estimated to increase over time since the move. Furthermore, the first
relocation eﬀect for men is estimated to be small 1-3 months after the move.
Similarly both relocation eﬀects for women are estimated to be zero 1-3
months after the move. Furthermore, descriptive evidence shows that out of
the 3,720 individuals who find their first job outside the local labour market
in the observation period only 248 relocate to another municipality within
a six months interval around the time of beginning in the first job. This
evidence does not support the hypothesis that refugees first search for a job
outside commuting distance and then move once they have accepted a distant
job. Therefore, we contend that the large positive eﬀect of relocation on the
hazard rate into first job is in fact a causal eﬀect.
Besides the ’direct’ relocation eﬀects reported in Table 6.3, relocation af-
fects the hazard rate into first job through changes in the observed location
characteristics, i.e. if observed characteristics of the municipality of destina-
tion diﬀer from those of the municipality of origin. We refer to this relocation
eﬀect as the relocation eﬀect due to observables. We calculate the average
relocation eﬀect due to observables in the following way,
(
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X
location
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_
X
location
before )0
ˆ
β
location
u (15)
where
_
X
location
denotes the mean of observed municipality characteristics
across movers, ’before’ refers to the beginning of the first residential spell and
’after’ refers to the time immediately after relocation. Table 6.4 reports the
relocation eﬀect due to observables for the first move and for two moves. On
average, this eﬀect is negative, and for men it is statistically significant. For
women, the eﬀects are insignificant at the 5% level. Hence, (male) refugee
migrants moved to locations with less favourable employment prospects than
in the assigned municipality. Specifically, the average eﬀect of changes in
location characteristics after the first move corresponds to a decline in the
hazard rate into first job by 12-13%. The average eﬀect of changes in location
characteristics after two moves is larger; it corresponds to a decline in the
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hazard rate into first job by 19% for men and 15% for women. The diﬀerence
in the size of the relocation eﬀect due to observables after one move and two
moves is explained by the fact that relocations from a small or medium-sized
municipality to a large municipality constitute a larger share of second-time
relocations than first-time relocations.
Table 6.4 The relocation eﬀect due to observables on the hazard rate into
first job.
Sub sample: No. of moves Relocation eﬀect due to observables
Eﬀect Std. error
MEN One -0.134 0.061
Two -0.212 0.068
WOMEN One -0.146 0.085
Two -0.167 0.088
The total average eﬀect of relocation on the hazard rate into first job is
the sum of the direct eﬀect of relocation and the eﬀect due to observables.
Hence, relative to no move the hazard rate into first job for men is increased
by 8% 1-3 months after the first move, 46% 4-6 months after the first move
and around 38% from then on. Relative to no move the hazard rate into first
job for women decreased by 15% in the first three months after the first move,
but 4-6 months after the first move it is increased by 51% and from 7 months
after the first move and onwards it fluctuates between an increase of 26%
and 59%. The total average eﬀect of having moved twice can be calculated
similarly. Thus, in most cases the hazard rate into first job declines initially
after relocation, but a few months after relocation it increases to a level which
significantly exceeds the hazard rate in the case of no relocation.
Are relocation eﬀects of the estimated size also economically significant?
We can answer this question by calculating the eﬀect of relocation on the
predicted mean duration of first non-employment spell. The predicted mean
duration of first non-employment spell for a person with observed character-
istics X and unobserved characteristics
ˆ
vu is given by
E(Tu|X, ˆvu) =
Z ∞
0
ˆ
S(tu|X, ˆvu)dtu =
Z ∞
0
(exp(−
Z tu
0
ˆ
h(s|X, ˆvu)ds)dtu (16)
Table 6.5 summarizes the estimated relocation eﬀects in the following
way: first we calculate the predicted mean duration for an individual who
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does not move. Next, we calculate the change in the predicted duration for
three diﬀerent relocation scenarios: one relocation 16 months after initial
settlement, two relocations in months 16 and 31, and finally one relocation
in month 37. The latter simulation is meant to reflect the eﬀect of the main
new feature in the current Danish dispersal policy relative to the first Danish
dispersal policy, namely that placed refugees are not entitled to social benefits
in the municipality of destination if they leave the assigned municipality in
the first three years after assignment.6 For an average woman the relocation
eﬀects correspond to a decrease in the estimated time until first job of 41
months (corresponding to a 34% reduction) if she moves 16 months after
initial settlement and of 39 months if she moves twice. For men, the eﬀects
are 22 months for one relocation (corresponding to a 27% reduction) and
24 months for two relocations. All eﬀects are statistically significant. Thus,
only the first relocation really helped jobless refugee immigrants getting into
their first job.
Table 6.5 Predicted mean duration and change in mean duration of first
non-employment spell for an individual with average characteristics.
Predicted Predicted change in mean duration
mean duration
Number of moves: None One Two One
Sub sample: Time of move: Month 16 Months 16, 31 Month 37
MEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu= 0) 58.5 (1.86) -14.4 (1.37) -15.4 (1.55) -9.4 (0.91)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -1.018) 135.1 (8.00) -38.9 (3.87) -46.2 (4.54) -33.7 (3.41)
Average person 82.6 (2.84) -21.9 (2.06) -24.4 (2.51) -16.8 (1.62)
WOMEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu= 0) 97.0 (5.32) -30.5 (3.55) -29.1 (5.35) -24.6 (2.77)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -0.920) 206.2 (21.92) -77.4 (7.97) -74.2 (13.60) -70.8 (6.77)
Average person 122.6 (6.73) -41.3 (4.27) -39.3 (7.54) -34.9 (3.82)
Notes: All durations are measured in months. An average male person is
0.45·type1+0.55·type2. An average female person is 0.571·type1+0.429·type2.
Standard errors calculated by Monte Carlo methods are reported in parentheses.
The introduction of a three year relocation restriction under the current
Danish dispersal policy implies a cost in terms of employment. For an average
6Obviously, such an interpretation should be made very cautiously, since the change in
rules may aﬀect the estimated parameters of the model.
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individual who in the absence of the relocation restriction move away 16
months after initial settlement, the introduction of a three year relocation
restriction is predicted to increase time until first job by 5.1 months for an
average man and by 6.4 months for an average woman.
The results discussed above support the hypothesis that refugees moving
improved the employment prospects of individuals. We have shown that, de-
spite the fact that observed municipal characteristics are on average ’better’
in the initial municipality, movers still gain from moving, which supports the
hypothesis of a reservation wage eﬀect; individuals postpone job search until
they have found a satisfactory municipality in which to reside, and then they
lower their reservation wage in order to find employment. An extension of
the introduction period from 18 months to 3 years would lead to a lower
reduction in expected time until first job for those who move.
6.4 Spatial dispersal policy: Winners and losers
The estimated model can be used to predict the time until first job for an
individual in the counterfactual case of no spatial dispersal policy, i.e. for
an individual who is unrestricted in residential choice. Obviously, such a
calculation entails many assumptions, and it should therefore be interpreted
cautiously. Nevertheless, we feel that it can provide instructive information
of use for policy makers.
We calculate the predicted time until first job for an individual with av-
erage demographic and socio-economics characteristics under three diﬀerent
assumptions about the counterfactual distribution of refugees across munic-
ipalities. In scenario 1 we assume that all newly arrived refugees settle and
remain settled in one of the four largest municipalities in Denmark. In ad-
dition, we assume that each municipality share corresponds to its share of
the net-inflow of all immigrants (mainly refugees and family-reunified immi-
grants) to large municipalities in 1984. This scenario can be regarded as a
worst case scenario, since it counterfactually assumes that all newly arrived
refugees settle and remain settled in a large city while in fact it was only 52%
of the net-inflow of immigrants that settled in one of the large municipalities
in 1984. In scenario 2 we relax the second assumption and instead assume
that the share of refugees that settle in each large municipality corresponds
to the actual municipality share of the 1984 cohort of refugees that settled
in a large municipality. Finally, in scenario 3 we relax both of the strong
assumptions made in scenario 1. Instead of the first assumption we assume
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that refugees settle and stay in a large or medium-sized municipality. 97.4%
of the 1984 cohort of refugees did in fact initially settle in either a large or
medium-sized municipality. We divide medium-sized municipalities in two
categories: medium-sized municipalities within the greater Copenhagen area
and those outside. We assume that the municipality (category) share of
refugees correspond to the actual municipality (category) share of 1984 co-
hort of refugees who initially settled in a large or medium-sized municipality.
This is likely to be the most realistic scenario.
In each scenario, refugees are distributed across municipalities by mak-
ing random draws from the relevant distribution, and subsequently, mean
location characteristics including mean number of immigrants and fellow
countrymen are recalculated before the expected durations are calculated.
We furthermore assume that since the individual is able to settle in his or
her preferred location, the eﬀect of unobserved location characteristics corre-
sponds to the average relocation eﬀect due to unobservables. This amounts
to assuming that the estimated eﬀects of relocation reflect either unobserved
municipality characteristics or reservation wage eﬀects rather than the event
of relocation itself. To see how this assumption aﬀects the results, scenar-
ios 4-6 replicate the scenarios 1-3 with the relocation eﬀects left out of the
calculations.
The expected time until first job is calculated under each scenario, and
deducted from the expected time until first job for a stayer in an ’average’
municipality under the dispersal policy. The expected time until first job
is calculated for a person with average characteristics with respect to both
individual and municipality characteristics. The results of this exercise are
shown in Table 6.6. Looking first at the scenarios 1-3, removal of the dispersal
policy has a significantly negative impact on the expected time until first job
in all scenarios. In the most realistic scenario, the reduction in expected time
until first job is 23 months for men and 46 months for women, corresponding
to a 28 and 37% reduction respectively. Even in the worst case scenario (1),
there are fairly large reductions in the expected time until first job. Hence,
the dispersal policy imposes a rather large cost in terms of employment on
an average stayer. If instead we look at scenarios 4-6, that assumes that the
impact of relocation is an impact of the event of relocation rather than some
unobserved municipality characteristics or a reservation wage eﬀect, we find
the opposite, namely that removal of the dispersal policy leads to an increase
in the average time until first job. The impact is significant under scenarios
4 and 5, while the eﬀects are very small and insignificant under scenario 6.
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The true counterfactual is likely to lie somewhere between those measured
by the scenarios 3 and 6, hence, it is tempting to conclude that spatial
dispersal policies in Denmark has not promoted employment assimilation of
refugees. In contrast, it is likely to have harmed the employment assimilation
process, because placed refugees would rather relocate first and then start
searching for a job.
Table 6.6 Predicted change in mean duration of first non-employment
spell for an individual with mean characteristics in absence of a spatial dis-
persal policy.
Change in expected duration -
relative to stayers - under scenario
Sub sample: Unobs. heterogeneity: 1 2 3
MEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu= 0) -7.7 (2.9) -9.6 (3.2) -15.9 (3.7)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -1.018) -19.7 (8.9) -24.1 (8.1) -38.8 (8.9)
Average person -11.6 (4.6) -14.0 (5.0) -23.2 (5.3)
WOMEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu= 0) -21.5 (8.4) -19.4 (9.3) -34.4 (12.2)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -0.920) -51.1 (20.6) -46.7 (20.8) -79.9 (26.0)
Average person -28.5 (12.8) -26.7 (12.3) -45.7 (16.3)
4 5 6
MEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu= 0) 12.2 (4.0) 10.1 (3.7) 0.9 (0.7)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -1.018) 31.6 (10.7) 26.1 (9.4) 2.3 (1.9)
Average person 17.9 (6.0) 15.0 (5.7) 1.3 (1.1)
WOMEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu= 0) 23.4 (10.7) 26.9 (12.1) 2.2 (1.9)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -0.920) 53.3 (22.8) 57.7 (20.6) 5.2 (3.9)
Average person 31.5 (14.4) 34.4 (14.8) 3.0 (2.2)
Notes: Durations are measured in months. An average male person is 0.45 ·
type1 + 0.55 · type2. An average female person is 0.571 · type1 + 0.429 · type2.
Municipality shares used in each scenario are as follows. Scenarios 1 and 4: Copen-
hagen: 0.601, Aarhus: 0.221, Odense: 0.082, Aalborg: 0.097. Scenarios 2 and 5:
Copenhagen: 0.337, Aarhus: 0.362, Odense: 0.078, Aalborg: 0.224. Scenarios
3 and 6: Copenhagen: 0.208, Aarhus: 0.138, Odense: 0.048, Aalborg: 0.137,
medium-sized municipalities in the greater Copenhagen area: 0.085, medium-sized
municipalities outside the greater Copenhagen area: 0.298. Standard errors calcu-
lated by Monte Carlo methods are reported in parentheses.
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7 Conclusion
Spatial dispersal policies may influence labour market integration of refugees
through the job oﬀer arrival rate in the local labour market, and by aﬀecting
initial place utility, which depends on neighbourhood characteristics. We
have constructed a partial search model in which non-employed individuals
search simultaneously for a job and a better location of residence in order
to investigate the eﬀect of place utility on job search theoretically. Our
model predicts that the transition rate into local employment is increasing
in place utility while the transition rate into employment outside the local
labour market is decreasing in place utility. We argue that spatial dispersal
policies are likely to decrease average place utility of newly arrived refugees;
first, due to lack of free location choice; second, because place utility tends
to be increasing in the local number of fellow countrymen and immigrants,
local access to vocational institutions and local access to amenities oﬀered
by larger cities. By decreasing place utility of newly arrived refugees spatial
dispersal policies are likely to decrease overall transition rates into first job.
We test these predictions in the context of the Danish spatial dispersal
policy in force from 1986 until 1998, which randomly assigned refugees to lo-
cations conditional on a few observed characteristics. Our empirical results
show that refugees assigned to locations outside immigrant-dense cities had
a higher hazard rate into first job than refugees assigned to immigrant-dense
cities. However, refugees assigned to locations outside immigrant-dense cities
also had a significantly higher hazard rate into a new location of residence
than refugees within these cities. In particular, the relocation rate was found
to be decreasing in the local number of fellow countrymen and immigrants
and local population size. Moreover, relocation away from the assigned mu-
nicipality increases the hazard rate into first job, even though the destination
municipalities are on average characterised by less favourable employment
conditions. The eﬀect of relocation is small initially, but increases with time
spent in the new municipality. This finding rules out reverse causality. We
interpret the positive eﬀect of relocation as evidence of an improvement of un-
observed location characteristics, e.g. presence of an ethnic network. These
unobserved factors may not only increase the local job oﬀer arrival rate,
but may also increase the local job oﬀer acceptance rate by increasing place
utility.
Simulation results show that the Danish spatial dispersal policy on av-
erage hampered labour market integration of refugees who stayed or carried
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out a late move away from the assigned municipality, possibly by increasing
reservation wages for local jobs due to low place utility. Moreover, there is
evidence that removal of the dispersal policy would not harm the integration
process, and might in fact benefit it.
Overall, these results speak against using mandatory spatial dispersal
policies to promote labour market integration of refugees. Finally, they
strongly speak against spatial dispersal policies that restrict secondary mi-
gration of refugees, e.g. by making social benefits entitlement conditional on
residence in the assigned municipality. This type of relocation restriction is
an inherent part of the current Danish dispersal policy in practise since 1999.
Instead of mandatory spatial dispersal policies we recommend voluntary
spatial dispersal of refugees across locations with low regional unemploy-
ment, high percentage of county jobs, institutions for vocational and higher
education and many fellow countrymen. By making dispersed settlement vol-
untary, place utility is increased and as a result the transition rate into local
employment is increased. In addition, we recommend adoption of policies
that increase immigrants’ access to housing outside the existing immigrant
enclaves within the larger cities.
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Appendix
Construction of variables:
The following variables were constructed based on information from the
longitudinal administrative registers of Statistics Denmark on the immigrant
population in Denmark 1984-2001.
Years of education. This variable refers to total number of years of educa-
tion obtained before immigrating to Denmark. The variable was constructed
using survey information about an individual’s highest completed education
obtained prior to immigration. The level of the education can be inferred
from the education code, because in general the educational level is increas-
ing in the code value. The codes therefore allow us to construct a variable
of years of education completed which takes values 0.5 years (for pre-school
class) to 20 years (for masters degrees).
Ethnic stock. The total number of immigrants from each of the 17 refugee
countries was obtained for every year 1986-1997. The ’ethnic stock’ variable
denotes the total number of immigrants from the refugee’s country of origin.
Number of immigrants. The variable is the total number of immigrants
residing in the municipality of residence.
Number of fellow countrymen. This variable is a refugee’s number of
fellow countrymen in the municipality of residence.
Greater Copenhagen area. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a
refugee lives in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg County Municipality or in
Copenhagen County and 0 otherwise.
The following variables have been constructed using the annual time-series
data on municipality characteristics from Statistics Denmark’s website.
Small municipality. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in a municipality with less than or equal to 10,000 inhabitants, of which
there were approximately 139 out of the total of 275 Danish municipalities.
Medium municipality. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in a municipality with more than 10,000 and less than or equal to 100,000
inhabitants. This includes approximately 132 Danish municipalities.
Large municipality. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in a municipality with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Only four Dan-
ish municipalities fall into this category: Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense and
Aalborg.
% of county jobs. The variable gives the number of individuals employed
in the municipality of residence in per cent of the total number of individuals
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employed in the county. Administratively and politically, Denmark is divided
into 14 counties and one so-called county municipality.
# educational institutions. This variable includes 40 diﬀerent types of
institutions for vocational and higher education and denotes the number of
such institutions in the municipality of residence.
% social housing. The variable denotes the number of social housing
dwellings for all-year residence in the municipality of residence in per cent of
the total number of dwellings for all-year around residence in the municipality
of residence.
% right-wing votes. This variable is constructed as the sum of votes for
the Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party in per cent of the sum
of votes for the Liberal Party, the Conservative People’s Party, the Social
Democratic Party and the Socialist People’s Party at the latest local election.
The two former parties are traditional right-wing parties whereas the latter
two are traditional left-wing parties. Local elections take place every four
years.
Regional unemployment rate. This variable has been constructed by the
Local Government Studies on information from the Ministry of Transport on
the costs of transportation from the largest post oﬃce in each municipality
to each of the other 274 largest post oﬃces in the other municipalities. The
regional unemployment rate used in the present study gives the unemploy-
ment rate in a radius of DKK 60 of transport around the largest post oﬃce in
the municipality of residence. DKK 60 corresponds to approximately USD
9.20. The information on unemployment stems from Statistics Denmark’s
10% administrative register sample of the Danish population 1984-2001.
41
Table A.1. Summary statistics. Mean of initial values. Part A.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variables (N=16,979) (N=11,077)
Age 29.19 (9.29) 31.56 (10.48)
Married 0.40 (0.49) 0.72 (0.45)
Children aged 0-2 0.15 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44)
Children aged 3-17 0.28 (0.45) 0.52 (0.50)
Origin:
Poland 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.16)
Iraq 0.14 (0.34) 0.09 (0.28)
Iran 0.16 (0.36) 0.12 (0.33)
Vietnam 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.26)
Sri Lanka 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.23)
No citizenship 0.17 (0.38) 0.14 (0.35)
Ethiopia 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08)
Afghanistan 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Somalia 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23)
Rumania 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.10)
Chile 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04)
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.26 (0.44) 0.37 (0.48)
Ex-Yugoslavia (excl. BH) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.09)
Yugoslavia 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.07)
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Table A.1. Summary statistics. Mean of initial values. Part B.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variables (N=16,979) (N=11,077)
Year of immigration:
1985 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.16)
1986 0.18 (0.39) 0.09 (0.29)
1987 0.08 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26)
1988 0.06 (0.25) 0.05 (0.22)
1989 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
1990 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22)
1991 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
1992 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25)
1993 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22)
1994 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.18)
1995 0.32 (0.47) 0.44 (0.50)
1996 0.00 (0.01) 0 (0)
Educational level 4.81 (6.28) 4.68 (5.97)
Educational level missing 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49)
Ethnic stock 8507 (5406) 10164 (5429)
Municip. of residence:
Greater Copenhagen 0.16 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37)
Large municipality 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43)
Medium municipality 0.60 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49)
Small municipality 0.14 (0.34) 0.14 (0.35)
No. of immigrants 8184 (16362) 7682 (15463)
No. of fellow countrymen 255 (406) 289 (440)
Regional unemp. rate 9.80 (2.34) 10.09 (2.32)
% of county jobs 23.19 (25.35) 21.87 (24.10)
No. of educ. institutions 8.01 (9.79) 7.54 (9.38)
% social housing 19.63 (11.06) 20.33 (12.06)
% right-wing votes 41.97 (13.08) 42.43 (13.24)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
43
Figure A.1 Figure A.3
Figure A.2 Figure A.4
Estimated hazard function for exit to first job
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
0,012
0,014
0,016
0,018
0,02
1 14 27 40 53 66 79 92 105 118 131 144
Duration (months)
H
a
z
a
r
d
 
r
a
t
e
Men
Women
Estimated hazard function for relocation
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
0,012
0,014
0,016
0,018
0,02
1 14 27 40 53 66 79 92 105 118 131 144
Duration (months)
H
a
z
a
r
d
 
r
a
t
e
Men
Women
Predicted survivor function for first non-employment 
spell
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0 9
1
8
2
7
3
6
4
5
5
4
6
3
7
2
8
1
9
0
9
9
1
0
8
1
1
7
1
2
6
1
3
5
1
4
4
Duration (months)
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
 
r
a
t
e
Men
Women
Predicted survivor function for municipality of 
residence
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0 9
1
8
2
7
3
6
4
5
5
4
6
3
7
2
8
1
9
0
9
9
1
0
8
1
1
7
1
2
6
1
3
5
1
4
4
Duration (months)
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
 
r
a
t
e
Men
Women
